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By 
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Introduction 
Recently much press, radio, and TV coverage, local and national, has 
been focused on farms in Ohio that are experiencing financial difficulty, to 
the point of being sold on the court house steps. For sure the situations 
are real and painful. Painful, not only to the farm families, but to others 
around them, as evidenced by the support and concern of their neighboring 
farmers and agri-business community. It is important, however, that the 
problem be viewed in a perspective that helps us look at the total situation. 
Focusing attention on isolated conditions of economic strife can lead to un-
warranted conclusions about the situation in general. Such conclusions can 
and will mask the real problem and can lead decision-makers to attempt solu-
tions that will only exacerbate the real problem. 
Scope of the Situation 
Let's look at some real and not uncommon Ohio situations that will help 
describe the range of the current situation. 
Situation 1: Financial Distress 
A family farm carrying approximately $1.5 million of debt with the 
ability to service less than half of that and just receiving noti-
fication requesting payment be made that will most likely result 
in a foreclosure action and bankruptcy filing within the month. 
*Department of Agricultural Economics and Rural Sociology, The Ohio State 
University, Columbus, Ohio, January 1983 . 
Situation 2: Financially Sound 
Another family agonizing and losing sleep because of money that 
it found necessary to borrow; very disturbed because "the farm 
has been in the family for three generations and this is the 
first dollar the farm has ever had to borrow." 
Other examples of either extreme can be found. Of course most situations 
will be somewhere in between. It is, however, important that we keep things 
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in perspective. It is my best judgement, after talking with numerous farmers 
and lenders, that it is only a small portion of our farmers that are in a 
"crisis" situation at this time. Make no mistake, it is fully appreciated 
and understood that all of our grain farmers are feeling the heat of a much 
reduced cash flow and that the fewness of those in "crisis" situations does 
not diminish the severity of their anguish. However, to rationally deal with 
the problem, we must also be cognizant of the fact that while some farmers 
are electing bankruptcy or are being served with foreclosure notices, many 
others are weathering the storm and still others are simply depositing less 
in their savings accounts. Table 1 can help us put the situation in perspec-
tive. 
The table warrants explanation. Keep in mind we are talking about all 
census farms (those that sell $1000 or more of product) and we are describing 
a January 1 balance sheet situation; i.e., thos~ farmers with no debt may 
have used credit throughout the year but had it paid off by January 1. The 
numbers indicate, in my best judgement, that about three percent of all 
Ohio farmers are in such difficult financial situations that a return to 
$3.00 corn would not solve their problem; these farms would consist of sit-
uations that are too highly leveraged and mismanaged. Another two percent 
can be described as farms that creditors have already carried for a year or 
two because of poor weather and crops and near the term outlook will not 
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Table 1: GENERALIZED FINANCIAL SITUATION 
OHIO FARMERS 
JANUARY 1983 
Financial Description 
Zero Debt 
With Debt 
Survivors 
Crisis if low prices persist beyond 1983 
Crisis: Creditors will carry in 1983 
Crisis: Creditors will not carry in 1983 
Unsalvageable even with higher prices 
Percent of Farms 
50 
25 
15 
5 
2 
3 
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allow them to become current in the foreseeable future. Another five percent 
are in a crisis situation but lenders will carry them during 1983 because 
their situations have not deteriorated to the point of being unsalvageable. 
The next group, 15 percent of the total, are in critical economic balance; 
they have had adequate reserves to weather the storm to now, but will be 
in severe difficulty if the current situation continues beyond 1983. The 
last group with debt (25 percent) will be able to survive current conditions 
because their debt load is low enough to allow debt payments to be met by 
decreasing other expenses and family living. 
Strength and Weakness 
The information in Table 2 helps put the problem in proper perspe_ctive 
hy indicating the strength and weakness of Ohio's farming community. Ohio's 
ITEM 
% Equity 
Equity 
($ billions) 
Cash Reserves 
($ millions) 
Net Farm Income 
(% of Gross) 
Net Farm Income 
(% of Debt) 
Table 2: FARM FINANCIAL CONDITION 
SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS 
OHIO, 1978-1983 
1978 1979 1980 1981 
87 88 88 87 
23 27 31 32 
441 257 184 198 
18 23 12 6 
20 25 14 6 
1_/ Preliminary USDA estimates 
]:_! Educated guesses 
198~/ 
84 82 
27 25 
183 175 
5 6 
6 7 
farming industry has a strong balance sheet, even though it exhibits less 
strength today than it did only two years ago. An equity situation of 82 
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percent or even 80 percent makes farming the envy of nearly every other busi-
ness sector of our economy. The recent decline to the projectl"d 82 percent 
equity results from lower crop, machinery, and real estate prices. As an 
industry Ohio's farms are a safe place for debt capital (i.e., the assets 
are there to cover additional debt without difficulty). There are of course 
those isolated instances where debt now exceeds assets that are causing con-
cern and stress both on the farms and in the lenders' offices. 
Farmers themselves are not so much concerned with the percent equity 
discussed above. They bemoan the approximate $7 billion loss in equity they 
have experienced during the past two years and wonder when will it end and 
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if they should sell now, before its all gone. Still, when all is said and 
done, Ohio agriculture in total has a strong balance sheet. 
The weakness, and the issue of primary concern to farmers and lenders, 
.is the sharply reduced cash flow, as evidenced by the numbers in Table 2. 
The first evidence of a cash flow problem is exhibited by the fact that 
farmers, to meet cash conunitments, have reduced their cash reserves signi-
ficantly during the past few years. Some of the reduction during the late 
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70's was the result of transferring cash to non-cash assets, as land and equip-
ment were purchased. The decline since 1981, however, has largely been the re-
sult of reduced cash income. Notice the decline in net farm income as a 
percentage of gross since 1979. This is a measure of the farming conununity's 
ability to pay principal debt and provide for family living. Another indi-
cator of the current and impending "cash crisis" is the reduction in net 
farm income as a percent of total debt. Both of these measures.are expected 
to improve slightly in 1983 because of lower interest rates and a "pay-down" 
in debt. The weakness in Ohio agriculture is cash flow. This is cause for 
concern; first for those farmers and lenders already engulfed and secondly, 
by those seeing themselves as "next in line." 
Crisis Situations 
Little more can be said, except to categorize the crisis situations and 
possibly identify the elements of the crisis. It is very difficult to 
document the specifics of who is or is not going out of business because of 
the current situation. We will not know the full effect of this adjustment 
in agriculture until the adjustment period is past. 
Knowingly, the previous discussions did not speak to specific situa-
tions of difficulty. Nor did they attempt to speak to the type of farming 
or age of farmer that is in most difficulty. Without much risk of being 
wrong, one can easily say that the perponderance of crisis situations in 
1983 are highly leveraged grain farms operated by younger farm families. 
To be sure, however, other types of farms and older operators are also 
experiencing economic difficulty. The crisis situations can generally be 
categorized as shown in Table 3. 
Table 3: CRISIS CATEGORIES 
OHIO FARMS 
1983 
I. Part-time Farms 
II. Connnercial Farms 
A. Poor Management 
B. Rapid, highly-levered growth in late 70's 
C. Natural disaster situations 
D. Combination of A, B and/or C 
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If part-time farmers are in economic difficulty it is primarily due to reduced 
off-farm income. They never intended the farm to support the family and in 
fact have probably supported their habit, farming, by working in town. Their 
difficulties, if any, do not really stem from the farm economic climate. The 
connnercial farmers, those that make their living from farming, can be in 
trouble for any number or combination of reasons; among which are poor manage-
ment, natural disasters, and "too much/too fast." It is the elements of cri-
sis on connnercial farms that become important as one tries to assess the 
problem and determine what might be done to correct the situation. 
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Elements of the Crisis 
There seem to be four elements interacting in Ohio's farm industry that 
result in varying degrees of economic strifeorlack thereof. Table 4 iso-
lates these elements. 
Table 4: ELEMENT OF FINANCIAL CRISIS 
OHIO FARMS 
1983 
I. General Uncontrolled Economic Circumstance 
II. Localized Uncontrolled Economic Circumstance 
III. Overt Risk-Taking 
IV. Poor Management 
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The part of the economic stress that farmers are experiencing because of 
lower product prices and general economic recession is common to all produ-
cers. If this were the primary reason for the bankruptcies and foreclosures 
most if not all farmers would be "sold out," instead of the estimated five 
percent. A second element of the problem that is not farmer caused, but 
which could have been insured against, is that of poor crops resulting from 
one or two years of natural disasters, hail and/or a wet spring. The most 
difficult of these situations are instances of nearly complete loss of grain 
crops for two years. These aretheheart-wrenching situations that everyone 
would like to correct, if it were possible. In many cases, however, there 
is little more that can be done. Debt has been restructured, payments have 
been delayed, reserves are gone, and so much money has been borrowed to 
cover losses that all hope of "ever getting back on tract" is gone . 
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The third and fourth elements, poor management and high risk, are to a 
large extent, the cause of a lot of crisis situations and are completely 
under the control of the farmer. Those individuals that took the risk, cal-
culated or uncalculated, and incurred unreasonable amounts of debt to pur-
chase high priced land and/or equipment were simply gambling and lost; 
gambling that product prices would remain high and land prices would continue 
to escalate. They were dealt a poor hand and need to accept the consequences 
of their willingness to accept high levels of risk. Risk, as we all know, 
creates opportunity for profit without any guarantees. Likewise those indi-
viduals that are in difficulty because of poor management (low yields, high 
costs, poor marketing, low efficiency, too big or too small, too much debt, 
etc.) need to accept the responsibility for their poor performance. The farm 
economy has in the past and will continue to weed out poor performers. 
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